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Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality

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  • Veronica Guerrieri
  • Robert Shimer

Abstract

We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets affected by adverse selection. There exists a unique equilibrium where better assets trade at higher prices but in less liquid markets. Sellers of high-quality assets can separate because they are more willing to accept a lower trading probability. As a result, the emergence of adverse selection generates a drop in liquidity. It may also lead to a decline in the price-dividend ratio--a fire sale--and a flight to quality. Subsidies to purchasing assets may be Pareto improving and can reverse the fire sale and flight to quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer, 2012. "Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality," NBER Working Papers 17876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17876
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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