Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion in Decentralized Markets
AbstractWhy do some markets remain liquid even when there is a positive gain from trade? In order to understand the real determinants of market liquidity in decentralized markets, we are going to analyze this question in a competitive market setting when both search frictions and adverse selection play roles. In a dynamic environment with heterogeneous sellers and buyers, we investigate the role of market frictions and how adverse selection leads to the distortion of equilibrium market liquidity. The resulting friction therefore prohibits resources from reallocating efficiently. In the application of capital reallocation, we further show that this trading friction can generate significant economic fluctuations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1513.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-01-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2011-01-30 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer, 2012.
"Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality,"
NBER Working Papers
17876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer, 2014. "Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 1875-1908, July.
- Enchuan Shao, 2013. "The Threat of Counterfeiting in Competitive Search Equilibrium," Working Papers 13-22, Bank of Canada.
- Michael J. Fishman & Jonathan A. Parker, 2012. "Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses," NBER Working Papers 18358, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.