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Creating a Bigger Pie? The Effects of Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Stock Options on Workplace Performance

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  • Joseph R. Blasi
  • Richard B. Freeman
  • Chris Mackin
  • Douglas L. Kruse

Abstract

This paper uses data from NBER surveys of over 40,000 employees in hundreds of facilities in 14 firms and from employees on the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys to explore how shared compensation affects turnover, absenteeism, loyalty, worker effort, and other outcomes affecting workplace performance. The empirical analysis shows that shared capitalism has beneficial effects on all outcomes save for absenteeism and that it has its strongest effects on turnover, loyalty, and worker effort when it is combined with: a) high-performance work policies (employee involvement, training, and job security), b) low levels of supervision, and c) fixed wages that are at or above market level. Most workers report that cash incentives, stock options, ESOP stock, and ESPP participation motivate them to work harder. The interaction of the effects of shared capitalism with other corporate policies suggests that the various shared capitalist and other policies may operate through a latent variable, "corporate culture".

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14230.

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Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14230

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Leila Baghdadi & Rihab Bellakhal & Marc-Arthur Diaye, 2012. "Do French firms use financial participation to transfer more risk to their workers?," Documents de recherche 12-10, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
  2. Andrews, Martyn & Bellmann, Lutz & Schank, Thorsten & Upward, Richard, 2010. "The impact of financial participation on workers' compensation (Der Einfluss von finanzieller Mitarbeiterbeteiligung auf die Entlohnung der Arbeitnehmer)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 43(1), pages 72-89.
  3. repec:iab:iabzaf:v:43:i:1:p:72-89 is not listed on IDEAS

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