IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/11317.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

Author

Listed:
  • Matias Iaryczower
  • Pablo Spiller
  • Mariano Tommasi

Abstract

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Matias Iaryczower & Pablo Spiller & Mariano Tommasi, 2005. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation," NBER Working Papers 11317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11317
    Note: LE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w11317.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    2. Mario Bergara & Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, 2002. "Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: Congressional Constraint," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1402, Department of Economics - dECON.
    3. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    4. Baron, David P., 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 33-47, March.
    5. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
    6. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    7. Helmke, Gretchen, 2002. "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(2), pages 291-303, June.
    8. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    9. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. "Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-284, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Iaryczower, Matias & Lewis, Garrett & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "To elect or to appoint? Bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 230-244.
    2. Rui J. P. De Figueiredo & Geoff Edwards, 2007. "Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 547-576, September.
    3. Garoupa, Nuno & Grembi, Veronica, 2015. "Judicial review and political partisanship: Moving from consensual to majoritarian democracy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 32-45.
    4. Santanu Sarkar, 2019. "How independent is India’s labour law framework from the state’s changing economic policies?," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , vol. 30(3), pages 422-440, September.
    5. Nuno Garoupa & Marian Gili & Fernando Gómez‐Pomar, 2012. "Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(4), pages 795-826, December.
    6. Urbiztondo, Santiago & Cristini, Marcela & Moskovits, Cynthia & Saiegh, Sebastián, 2009. "The Political Economy of Productivity in Argentina: Interpretation and Illustration," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1119, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. Raphaël Franck, 2018. "Judicial impartiality in politically charged cases," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 193-229, June.
    8. Roberto Cortes Conde, 2008. "Spanish America Colonial Patterns: The Rio de La Plata," Working Papers 96, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2008.
    9. Pablo T. Spiller & Sanny Liao, 2006. "Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey," NBER Working Papers 12209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matias J Iaryczower, 2005. "Essays in Political Influence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000945, David K. Levine.
    2. Mariano Tommasi & Matias Iaryczower & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law, Constitutional Interpretation. Argentina 1935-1998," Working Papers 73, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jun 2004.
    3. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Pablo T. Spiller & Sanny Liao, 2006. "Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey," NBER Working Papers 12209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Sergei Severinov, 2003. "Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 733-764, August.
    6. Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Dumping and double crossing: The (in)effectiveness of cost-based trade policy under incomplete information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 7, pages 129-152, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    8. Westermark, Andreas, 2004. "Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 421-452, May.
    9. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019. "Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
    10. Thomas Bassetti & Filippo Pavesi, 2017. "Electoral Contributions And The Cost Of Unpopularity," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1771-1791, October.
    11. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
    12. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L., 2023. "Pervasive signaling," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    13. Hallman, Alice & Spiro, Daniel, 2023. "A theory of hypocrisy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 401-410.
    14. Cartwright, Edward, 2009. "Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 164-185, May.
    15. David Austen-Smith & Roland G. Fryer, 2003. "The Economics of 'Acting White'," NBER Working Papers 9904, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. David Austen-Smith, 2002. "Peer Pressure and Job Market Signaling," Discussion Papers 1352, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Suvorov, Anton & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2009. "Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 665-681, November.
    18. Grossman, Zachary, 2010. "Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt7320x2cp, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    19. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 391-413, August.
    20. Amrish Patel & Edward Cartwright, 2009. "Social Norms and Naive Beliefs," Studies in Economics 0906, School of Economics, University of Kent.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11317. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.