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The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy

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  • Helmke, Gretchen

Abstract

Building on the separation-of-powers approach in American politics, this article develops a new micro-level account of judicial decision-making in contexts where judges face institutional insecurity. Against conventional wisdom, I argue that under certain conditions the lack of judicial independence motivates judges to “strategically defect†against the government once it begins losing power. The result is a reverse legal–political cycle in which antigovernment decisions cluster at the end of weak governments. Original data on more than 7,500 individual decisions by Argentine Supreme Court justices (1976–1995) are used to test hypotheses about why, when, and in which types of cases judges are likely to engage in strategic defection. Consistent with the theory's predictions, the results of the analysis show a significant increase in antigovernment decisions occurring at the end of weak dictatorships and weak democratic governments. Examining subsets of decisions and controlling for several additional variables further corroborate the strategic account.

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  • Helmke, Gretchen, 2002. "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(2), pages 291-303, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:96:y:2002:i:02:p:291-303_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Emily Hencken Ritter & Courtenay R. Conrad, 2016. "Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 449-475, December.
    2. Iaryczower, Matias & Lewis, Garrett & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "To elect or to appoint? Bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 230-244.
    3. Cook, Thomas R. & Liu, Amy H., 2016. "Using Linguistic Networks to Explain Strength of Intellectual Property Rights," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 128-138.
    4. Jaewook Byeon & Iljoong Kim & Dongwon Lee, 2018. "Protest and property crime: political use of police resources and the deterrence of crime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 181-196, April.
    5. Marek M. Kaminski & Monika Nalepa, 2006. "Judging Transitional Justice," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(3), pages 383-408, June.
    6. Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini, 2006. "Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 165-187, September.
    7. Mejía Acosta, Andrés & Araujo, María Caridad & Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal & Saiegh, Sebastián, 2006. "Veto Players, Fickle Institutions and Low-Quality Policies: The Policymaking Process in Ecuador," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3342, Inter-American Development Bank.
    8. repec:gig:joupla:v:5:y:2013:i:2:p:37-70 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Jessica Maves Braithwaite & Joseph M Cox & Margaret Farry, 2022. "Tactics of resistance and post-conflict judicial independence," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(6), pages 779-793, November.
    10. Timur Kuran & Scott Lustig, 2012. "Judicial Biases in Ottoman Istanbul: Islamic Justice and Its Compatibility with Modern Economic Life," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(3), pages 631-666.
    11. Andrés Mejía Acosta & María Caridad Araujo & Anibal Pérez-Liñán & Sebastian Saiegh, 2006. "Actores con veto, instituciones caprichosas y políticas de mala calidad: el proceso de diseño de políticas de Ecuador," Research Department Publications 3227, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    12. Iaryczower, Matias & Spiller, Pablo T. & Tommasi, Mariano, 2006. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 85-97, February.
    13. Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, 2008. "Agent permeability, principal delegation and the European Court of Human Rights," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-28, March.
    14. Staton, Jeffrey K., 2004. "When Judges Go Public: The Selective Promotion of Case Results on the Mexican Supreme Court," University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies qt4jq0f4d4, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego.
    15. Matias J Iaryczower, 2005. "Essays in Political Influence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000945, David K. Levine.
    16. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:107-140 is not listed on IDEAS

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