The Economics of 'Acting White'
Abstract
This paper formalizes a sociological phenomenon entitled 'acting white'. The key idea is that individuals face a tension between signaling their type to the outside labor market and signaling their type to a peer group: signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer rejection. We prove three basic results: (1) there exists no equilibria in which all types of individuals adopt distinct educational investment levels; (2) when individuals are not too patient, all equilibria satisfying a standard refinement involve a binary partition of the type space in which all types accepted by the group pool on a common low education level and all types rejected by the group separate at distinctly higher levels of education with correspondingly higher wages; and (3) when individuals are very patient, there is an increase in the variation of education levels within the group and an increase in the variance of types deemed acceptable by the group. The more those involved discount the future, the more salient peer pressure becomes and the more homogenous groups become.Download Info
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9904.Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9904
Note: LS
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Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-08-17 (All new papers)
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
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"City-structure, job search and labor discrimination : theory and policy implications,"
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0403, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
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"The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names,"
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9938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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