Uncertainty as commitment
AbstractTime-inconsistency of no-bailout policies can create incentives for banks to take excessive risks and generate endogenous crises when the government cannot commit. However, at the outbreak of financial problems, usually the government is uncertain about their nature, and hence it may delay intervention to learn more about them. We show that intervention delay leads to strategic restraint: banks endogenously restrict the riskiness of their portfolio relative to their peers in order to avoid being the worst performers and bearing the cost of such delay. These novel forces help to avoid endogenous crises even when the government cannot commit. We analyze the effect of government policies from the perspective of this new result.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute in its series National Bank of Poland Working Papers with number 141.
Date of creation: 2013
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More information through EDIRC
bailouts; commitment; liquidity; banking; government policy; regulation;
Other versions of this item:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- A hesitant government may have good aspects
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-03-15 14:42:00
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- Javier Bianchi, 2012. "Efficient Bailouts?," NBER Working Papers 18587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Javier Bianchi, 2012. "Efficient bailouts?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 133, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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