The Hazards of Debt: Rollover Freezes, Incentives, and Bailouts
AbstractWe investigate the trade-off between incentive provision and inefficient rollover freezes for a firm financed with short-term debt. First, debt maturity that is too short-term is inefficient, even with incentive provision. The optimal maturity is an interior solution that avoids excessive rollover risk while providing sufficient incentives for the manager to avoid risk-shifting when the firm is in good health. Second, allowing the manager to risk-shift during a freeze actually increases creditor confidence. Debt policy should not prevent the manager from holding what may appear to be otherwise low-mean strategies that have option value during a freeze. Third, a limited but not perfectly reliable form of emergency financing during a freeze--a "bailout"--may improve the terms of the trade-off and increase total ex ante value by instilling confidence in the creditor markets. Our conclusions highlight the endogenous interaction between risk from the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: email@example.com., Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 25 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Thomas M. Eisenbach, 2013. "Rollover risk as market discipline: a two-sided inefficiency," Staff Reports 597, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Gechun Liang & Eva L\"utkebohmert & Wei Wei, 2012. "Funding Liquidity, Debt Tenor Structure, and Creditor's Belief: An Exogenous Dynamic Debt Run Model," Papers 1209.3513, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2013.
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