Workers behavior and labor contract : an evolutionary approach
AbstractThis article investigates the co-evolution of labor relationships and workers preferences. According to recent experimental economics findinggs on social preferences, the workforce is assumed to be heterogeneous. It is composed by both cooperative and non-cooperative workers. In addition, firms differ by the type of contract they offer (explicit or implicit). Finally, both the distribution of preferences and the degree of contractual completeness are endogeneized. Preferences evolve through a process of cultural transmission and the proportion of implicit contracts is driven by an evolutionary process. The complementarity between the transmission of cooperation and the implementation of implicit contracts leads to multiple equilibria which allow for path-dependence. This property is illustrated by the evolutions of American and Japanese labor contracts during the Twentieth century.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number v08028.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
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Explicit contract; implicit contract; cultural transmission; preferences for reciprocity; path dependence.;
Other versions of this item:
- Victor Hiller, 2010. "Workers' Behavior And Labor Contract: An Evolutionary Approach," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 152-179, 02.
- Victor Hiller, 2008. "Workers behavior and labor contract : an evolutionary approach," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00275734, HAL.
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-05-17 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2008-05-17 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-05-17 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-05-17 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Gregory Ponthiere, 2011.
"Mortality, Family and Lifestyles,"
Journal of Family and Economic Issues,
Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 175-190, June.
- Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo & Moreira, Helmar Nunes, 2011.
"Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market,"
36994, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo & Moreira, Helmar Nunes, 2011. "Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market," MPRA Paper 36932, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo, 2011. "Lyapunov Stability in an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market," MPRA Paper 29957, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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