This paper investigates behavior in the Traveler's Dilemma game and isolates deviations from textbook predictions caused by di®erences in welfare perceptions and strategic miscalculations. It presents the results of an experimental analysis based on a 2x2 design where the own and the other subject's bonus-penalty parameters are changed independently. We ¯nd that the change in own bonus-penalty alone entirely explains the e®ect on claims of a simultaneous change in one's own and the other's bonus-penalty. An increase in the other subject's bonus-penalty has a signi¯cant negative e®ect on claims when the own bonus-penalty is low, whereas it does not have a signi¯cant e®ect when the own bonus-penalty is high. We also ¯nd that expected claims are inconsistent with actual claims in the asymmetric treatments. Focus- ing on reported strategies, we document substantial heterogeneity and show that changes in choices across treatments are to a large extent explained by risk aversion.
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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
147.
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