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Social preferences are not enough: Accounting for anomalous behavior in a complex mixed-motive game

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  • Rodrigo Moro
  • Esteban Freidin
  • Fernando Tohmé

Abstract

In some economic games, participants systematically display behavior that departs from the model of payoff maximization, and this is usually attributed to social preferences. In this paper we focus on a new interactive context, a mixed-motive game called “Alternative Traveler’s Dilemma” (ATD). In this context, most participants choose strictly dominated strategies. Preliminary studies suggest the reason for such a tendency is that participants have social preferences, usually competitive in nature. The question is whether some cognitive factors should also be included in models that account for the tendency at stake. More specifically, we investigate whether participants neglect payoff maximization, that is, whether they fail to notice that, by pursuing some competitive goal, they are not maximizing their payoffs. We report the results of an experiment that supports this hypothesis. We conclude that in order to explain anomalous behavior in the ATD, and similar games, we need to study the cognitive factors that bound participants’ strategies and understanding of the game. ***** En algunos juegos económicos el comportamiento de los participantes difiere de manera sistemática del modelo de maximización de pagos y esto es usualmente atribuido a preferencias sociales. En este artículo, nos enfocamos en un nuevo contexto interactivo, un juego de motivos mixtos llamado “dilema del viajero alternativo” (DVA). En este contexto, la mayoría de los participantes eligen estrategias estrictamente dominadas. Estudios preliminares sugieren que los participantes tendrían preferencias sociales, usualmente de naturaleza competitiva. La pregunta es si algún factor cognitivo debería ser también incluido en el modelo que explica la tendencia de elección en cuestión. Más específicamente, investigamos si los participantes son negligentes con respecto a la maximización de pagos; es decir, no se dan cuenta de que, al perseguir determinado fin competitivo, se están perdiendo de maximizar sus ganancias. Reportamos un experimento que soporta esta hipótesis. Concluimos que para explicar comportamiento anómalo en el DVA y juegos similares, se necesitan estudiar los factores cognitivos que limitan las estrategias y el entendimiento del juego por parte de los participantes.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrigo Moro & Esteban Freidin & Fernando Tohmé, 2015. "Social preferences are not enough: Accounting for anomalous behavior in a complex mixed-motive game," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000093:012719
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    References listed on IDEAS

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