Do Federal Reserve Presidents Communicate with a Regional Bias?
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze the determinants of U.S. monetary policy stance as expressed in speeches by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials over the period January 1998 to September 2009. Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of these speeches. Our results are, first, that Fed governors and presidents follow a Taylor rule when expressing their opinions: a rise in inflation or the Leading Index makes a hawkish speech more likely. Second, when Fed presidents make a speech in their home district, its content is influenced by both regional and national macroeconomic variables, whereas speeches given outside the home district are influenced solely by national information. Third, the influence of regional variables increases during (i) Ben Bernanke’s tenure as Fed Chairman, (ii) recessions, and (iii) the financial crisis. Finally, speeches by nonvoting presidents reflect regional economic development to a greater extent than those by voting presidents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201103.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Central Bank Communication; Disagreement; Federal Reserve; Monetary Policy; Regional Representation; Speeches;
Other versions of this item:
- Hayo, Bernd & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2013. "Do Federal Reserve presidents communicate with a regional bias?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 62-72.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-02-19 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-FMK-2011-02-19 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-MON-2011-02-19 (Monetary Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- A. Jung, 2013. "Policymakers’ Interest Rate Preferences: Recent Evidence for Three Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(3), pages 150-197, September.
- Bernd Hayo & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2013.
"Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB’s Decision Rule,"
Working Papers CEB
13-025, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Hayo, Bernd & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2013. "Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB's decision rule," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 135-160.
- Bernd Hayo & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2011. "Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB’s Decision Rule," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201135, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Bernd Hayo & Guillaume Méon, 2012.
"Why Countries Matter for Monetary Policy Decision-Making in the ESCB,"
CESifo DICE Report,
Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 10(1), pages 21-26, 04.
- Bernd Hayo & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2012. "Why Countries Matter for Monetary Policy Decision-Making in the ESCB," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/130369, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2013. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Working Paper Series 1579, European Central Bank.
- Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2011. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201140, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo).
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