Prejudice and Immigration
AbstractWe study immigration policy in a small open receiving economy under self-selection of migrants. We show that immigration policy choice affects and is affected by the migratory decisions of skilled and unskilled foreign workers. From this interaction multiple equilibria may arise, which are driven by the natives' expectations on the migrants' size and skill composition (and, hence, on the welfare effects of immigration). In particular, pessimistic (optimistic) beliefs induce a country to impose higher (lower) barriers to immigration, which crowd out (crowd in) skilled migrants and thus confirm initial beliefs. This self-fulfilling mechanism sustains the endogenous formation of an anti or pro-immigration "prejudice". These insights may help rationalize the cross-country variation in attitudes towards immigration and choices of immigration policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli in its series Working Papers CELEG with number 0904.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Immigration policy; skilled/unskilled workers; small open economy; multiple equilibria.;
Other versions of this item:
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kevin H. O'Rourke & Richard Sinnott, 2004.
"The Determinants of Individual Attitudes Towards Immigration,"
Trinity Economics Papers
20042, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
- O'Rourke, Kevin H. & Sinnott, Richard, 2006. "The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 838-861, December.
- Milo Bianchi & Paolo Buonanno & Paolo Pinotti, 2012.
"Do Immigrants Cause Crime?,"
- Milo Bianchi & Paolo Buonanno & Paolo Pinotti, 2008. "Do immigrants cause crime?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586864, HAL.
- Milo Bianchi & Paolo Buonanno & Paolo Pinotti, 2008. "Do Immigrants Cause Crime?," Working Papers 0801, University of Bergamo, Department of Economics.
- Bianchi, Milo & Buonanno, Paolo & Pinotti, Paolo, 2012. "Do Immigrants Cause Crime?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5382, Paris Dauphine University.
- Bianchi, Milo & Buonanno, Paolo & Pinotti, Paolo, 2010. "Do Immigrants Cause Crime?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1023, CEPREMAP.
- Milo Bianchi, 2013.
"Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(1), pages 1-23, 02.
- Bianchi, Milo, 2006. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 627, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 02 Nov 2006.
- Milo Bianchi, 2008. "Immigration policy and self-selecting migrants," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587710, HAL.
- Bianchi, Milo, 2013. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5377, Paris Dauphine University.
- Milo Bianchi, 2012. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Working Papers halshs-00670037, HAL.
- Paolo E. Giordani & Michele Ruta, 2012. "Self-Confirming Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3762, CESifo Group Munich.
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586864 is not listed on IDEAS
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