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Monitoring and punishment networks in a common-pool resource dilemma: experimental evidence

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  • Ganga Shreedhar, Alessandro Tavoni, Carmen Marchiori

Abstract

In an experimental study, we explore how imperfect monitoring and punishment network architectures impacts cooperation, punishment and beliefs, in a non-linear common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We find that complete networks (with perfect monitoring and punishment), are the least efficient due to higher punishment, relative to incomplete networks. In addition, high appropriators are sanctioned in all networks, but well-connected and undirected networks elicit higher anti-social punishment. Lastly, although subject’s underestimate other’s appropriation in all networks, the difference between beliefs and other’s appropriation declines with time. This decline occurs faster in complete networks, relative to incomplete but connected networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Ganga Shreedhar, Alessandro Tavoni, Carmen Marchiori, 2018. "Monitoring and punishment networks in a common-pool resource dilemma: experimental evidence," GRI Working Papers 292, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    • Handle: RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp292
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