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Defending public goods and common-pool resources

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  • De Geest, Lawrence R.
  • Stranlund, John K.

Abstract

In many real-world social dilemmas the surplus from insider cooperation can be stolen by outsiders. We present experimental evidence of cooperation to create and defend surplus under positive and negative externalities. A decentralized group of insiders created surplus by providing a public good (PG) or managing a common-pool resource (CPR), and used sanctions to deter outsiders from stealing the surplus created by these activities. Our theory predicts that theft would have the same effect on cooperation across settings. Instead, we found that an outside threat had a divergent effect on insider behavior. Surplus creation was significantly higher in the CPR setting, while surplus defense was significantly higher in the PG setting. However, sanctions did not significantly impact outsider behavior in either setting. Our results underscore the need for effective coordination mechanisms to help groups coordinate decisions when facing a shared threat.

Suggested Citation

  • De Geest, Lawrence R. & Stranlund, John K., 2019. "Defending public goods and common-pool resources," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 143-154.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:79:y:2019:i:c:p:143-154
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.02.006
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coordination; Conflict; Sanctions; Common-pool resource; Public good; Social dilemma; Outsiders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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