The Role of Rivalry. Public Goods versus Common-Pool Resources
AbstractDespite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is considerable confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In this paper we argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference between the two games. We show that rivalry implies that both games cannot be represented by the same game theoretic structure. Fur-thermore, we experimentally study behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with identical Pareto opti-mum but divergent interior Nash equilibria. The results show that partici-pants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and converges to the respective Nash equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2004_2.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
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- Robin P. Cubitt & Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, 2008.
"Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games,"
2008-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Robin Cubitt & Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, 2011. "Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 254-272, May.
- Robin P. Cubitt & Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, 2008. "Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games," Discussion Papers 2008-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Martin Beckenkamp, 2006. "A game-theoretic taxonomy of social dilemmas," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 337-353, September.
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