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Der homo oeconomicus unter experimentellem Beschuß

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart

Abstract

Für Nichtökonomen ist oftmals schwer zu verstehen, warum die Ökonomen das Eigennutzmotiv so sehr in den Vordergrund stellen. Es ist doch offenkundig, dass die Menschen aus den vielfältigsten Motiven heraus handeln - aus Dankbarkeit, aus Ärger, aus sozialer Verpflichtung und aus vielen, vielen anderen Motiven. Daß die Ökonomen dennoch das Eigennutzmotiv in den Vordergrund stellen hat mehrere Gründe. Drei Sichtweisen erscheinen besonders wichtig: - homo oeconomicus als nützliche Approximation - homo oeconomicus als Idealtyp - homo oeconomicus als Als-Ob-Konstruktion Diese Begründungen für die Eigennutz- oder homo-oeconomicus-Annahme werden kurz skizziert. Es wird erläutert, warum diese Begründungen empirisch nicht widerlegt, sondern lediglich in ihrer Relevanz angegriffen werden können. Anschließend wird der evolutorische Gesichtspunkt, der der Als-Ob-Verteidigung des homo oeconomicus zu Grunde liegt, radikalisiert und es wird argumentiert, dass es zweckmäßig ist, sich den psychologischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Normenbildung theoretisch und experimentell zu nähern.

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2002. "Der homo oeconomicus unter experimentellem Beschuß," Discussion Papers in Economics 70965, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:70965
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Psychlogie; Soziologie; Verhaltensökonomik; Realismus; Rationalverhalten; eingeschränkte Rationalität; Anomalien; Institutionenökonomik; evolutorische Ökonomik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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