Equilibrium and Optimal R&D Roles in a Mixed Market
AbstractThis is the first paper to investigate the timing of the R&D decisions in a mixed market. Considering a model in which a public firm competes against a private one, we examine the desirable (welfare-maximizing) and the equilibrium R&D role of the public firm. Our results suggest that from a social point of view, the public firm should carry out its investment as a Stackelberg follower. Using the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky [Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1990) 29], we show that the public firm may play this desirable role.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Loughborough University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2007_08.
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision: Mar 2007
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More information through EDIRC
Endogenous timing; R&D; Stackelberg; mixed market.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-03-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IPR-2007-03-17 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2007-03-17 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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