This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Equilibrium and Optimal R&D Roles in a Mixed Market Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Vasileios Zikos () (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University )
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This is the first paper to investigate the timing of the R&D decisions in a mixed market. Considering a model in which a public firm competes against a private one, we examine the desirable (welfare-maximizing) and the equilibrium R&D role of the public firm. Our results suggest that from a social point of view, the public firm should carry out its investment as a Stackelberg follower. Using the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky [Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1990) 29], we show that the public firm may play this desirable role.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Loughborough University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
2007_08.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2007Date of revision:
Mar 2007Handle: RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2007_08Contact details of provider: Postal: Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU Phone: +44 (0) 1509 222701 Fax: +44 (0) 1509 223910 Web page: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec/Research.htm More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Dr. Claudio Piga).
Keywords: Endogenous timing ; R&D ; Stackelberg ; mixed market. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988.
"Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
María José Gil-Moltó & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & Vasileios Zikos, 2006.
"Public Policy towards R&D in a Mixed Duopoly with Spillovers ,"
Discussion Paper Series
2006_17, Department of Economics, Loughborough University.
[Downloadable!]
Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990.
"Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Nett, Lorenz, 1994.
"Why private firms are more innovative than public firms ,"
European Journal of Political Economy ,
Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 639-653, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jacques, Armel, 2004.
"Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: a forgotten equilibrium ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 147-148, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Delbono, Flavio & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1993.
"Regulating innovative activity : The role of a public firm ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 35-48, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Akira Nishimori & Hikaru Ogawa, 2005.
"Long-Term And Short-Term Contract In A Mixed Market ,"
Australian Economic Papers ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 275-289, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1998.
"R&D Competition in a Mixed Duopoly under Uncertainty and Easy Imitation ,"
Journal of Comparative Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 415-428, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Symeonidis, George, 2003.
"Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product R&D ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 39-55, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989.
"Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly ,"
Oxford Economic Papers ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-11, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fjell, Kenneth & Heywood, John S, 2002.
"Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms ,"
Australian Economic Papers ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(3), pages 267-81, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pal, Debashis, 1998.
"Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003.
"Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor ,"
Bulletin of Economic Research ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .