We develop a simple two-country model of international trade in which the transportation cost between countries is endogenously determined by decisions concerning capacity and price (road toll, rail fare) of infrastructure. We evaluate alternative regimes of pricing and investment, i.e., free access (e.g., public road), pricing and investment by two governments, and private operation. Comparisons between free-access and other regimes reveal that pricing plays a positive role of encouraging investment. However, pricing by governments results in lower welfare since excessively high prices are charged. We also show that higher welfare could be attained by elaborating the design of bidding systems for the right to build and operate the infrastructure.
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Paper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number
661.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures R42 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Government and Private Investment Analysis R48 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Government Pricing; Regulatory Policies
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