The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study
AbstractWe study majority voting over two alternatives in small groups. Individuals have identical preferences but are uncertain about which alternative can better achieve their common interest. Before voting, each individual can get informed, to wit, buy a valuable but imperfect signal about the better alternative. Voting is either voluntary or compulsory. In the compulsory mode, each individual can vote for either of the two alternatives, while in the voluntary mode they can also abstain. An uninformed random vote generates negative externalities, as it may override informative group decisions in pivotal events. In our experiment, participants in groups of three or seven get informed more often with compulsory than voluntary voting, and in this way partly counteract the curse of uninformed voting when they cannot avoid it by abstaining. Surprisingly, uninformed voting is a common phenomenon even in the voluntary mode! A consequence of substantial uninformed voting is poor group efficiency in all treatments, indicating the need to reconsider current practices of jury and committee voting.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Cologne, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 64.
Date of creation: 27 Aug 2013
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-09-06 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2013-09-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2013-09-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-09-06 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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