An endogenous timing analysis of international duopoly with transboundary stock pollution
AbstractThis paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly model with transboundary stock pollution, we show how an exact form of international competition depends on the magnitudes of international transportation coefficients of pollutant emissions and decay rates of pollutant stocks in respective countries as well as on other environmental and economic variables.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 31.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision: Apr 2007
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More information through EDIRC
international duopoly; transboundary pollution; stock pollution; gains from trade; endogenous timing.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2007-04-21 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2007-04-21 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-INT-2007-04-21 (International Trade)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grandmont, J. M. & McFadden, D., 1972. "A technical note on classical gains from trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 109-125, May.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990.
"Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
- Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
- Kemp, Murray C & Wan, Henry Y, Jr, 1972. "The Gains from Free Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(3), pages 509-22, October.
- Markusen, James R., 1981. "Trade and the gains from trade with imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 531-551, November.
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