This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly model with transboundary stock pollution, we show how an exact form of international competition depends on the magnitudes of international transportation coefficients of pollutant emissions and decay rates of pollutant stocks in respective countries as well as on other environmental and economic variables.
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Paper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
31.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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