Doing good with other people's money: A charitable giving experiment with students in environmental sciences and economics
AbstractWe augment a standard dictator game to investigate how preferences for an environmental project relate to willingness to limit others' choices. We explore this issue by distinguishing three student groups: economists, environmental economists, and environmental social scientists. We find that people are generally disposed to grant freedom of choice, but only within certain limits. In addition, our results are in line with the widely held belief that economists are more selfish than other people. Yet, against the notion of consumer sovereignty, economists are not less likely to restrict others' choices and impose restrictions closer to their own preferences than the other student groups.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2010-089.
Date of creation: 15 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
dictator game; charitable giving; social preferences; paternalism;
Other versions of this item:
- Carlsson, Fredrik & Kataria, Mitesh & Lampi, Elina & Levati, M., Vittoria, 2011. "Doing good with other people’s money: A charitable giving experiment with students in environmental sciences and economics," Working Papers in Economics 487, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-12-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2010-12-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-12-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2010-12-23 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2010-12-23 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-SOC-2010-12-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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