Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?
AbstractAlthough field experiments and classroom surveys are ambiguous about whether economists are less likely than others to cooperate in social dilemmas, three important points remain clear: economics training encourages the view that people are motivated primarily by self-interest; there is clear evidence that this view leads people to expect others to defect in social dilemmas; and there is also evidence that, when people expect partners to defect, they are overwhelmingly likely to defect themselves. These points' logical implications appear to place a heavy burden of proof on those who insist economics training does not inhibit cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 10 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
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