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Working Hours and Top Management Appointments: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

Author

Listed:
  • Frederiksen, Anders

    (Aarhus University)

  • Kato, Takao

    (Colgate University)

  • Smith, Nina

    (Aarhus University)

Abstract

By combining Danish registry data covering the population of Danish workers with the Danish Labor Force Survey (DLFS) which provides detailed data on working hours, we provide fresh evidence and insights on a potentially important role that career concerns/considerations play in accounting for the incidence of long working hours. First, we obtain new and robust evidence with external validity on a positive association between working hours and career success (measured by top management appointments). Second, we illuminate that the observed positive association between working hours and career success is consistent with three distinct theories: (i) human capital; (ii) rat race; and (iii) tournament. Third, guided by each theory, we go beyond a simple association between the quantity of working hours and career success, and explore what kinds of working hours are more beneficial for career advancement. Specifically we find: (i) for managers, working long hours will help them increase their odds of top management appointments in the same firm, while not in a different firm, while for non-managerial professionals and other workers, both internal and external hours will help them raise their odds of career success; (ii) the odds of top management appointments will rise significantly by becoming the longest working hour person among the peers; (iii) working nonstandard hours (evening/night) will be beneficial for career advancement; and (iv) workers with high desired hours will enjoy greater odds of top management appointments even after controlling for actual hours. We interpret each finding from the three theoretical perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederiksen, Anders & Kato, Takao & Smith, Nina, 2018. "Working Hours and Top Management Appointments: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data," IZA Discussion Papers 11675, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11675
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kentaro Asai, 2022. "Working Hour Reform, Labor Demand and Productivity," PSE Working Papers halshs-03728157, HAL.
    2. Kentaro Asai, 2022. "Working Hour Reform, Labor Demand and Productivity," Working Papers halshs-03728157, HAL.
    3. FitzRoy, Felix & Jin, Jim, 2021. "Some Welfare Economics of Working Time," IZA Discussion Papers 14810, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Eskildsen, Jacob Kjær & Frederiksen, Anders & Løkke, Ann-Kristina, 2018. "Employee Absence: An Organizational Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 11889, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    working hours; top management appointments; promotions; human capital; job assignment; rat race; adverse selection; tournament;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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