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Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule

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Author Info
Federico Valenciano () (Universidad del País Vasco)
Annick Laruelle (Universidad de Alicante)

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Abstract

Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this paper we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place 'in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of unanimous consensus. That is, a general agreement is looked for, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2005-24.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2005-24.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2005
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Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2005-24

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Related research
Keywords: Voting rule; Bargaining; Nash solution.;

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  1. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 317-339, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Jun, Byoung Heon, 1989. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(1), pages 59-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Chae, Suchan & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "A group bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-51, November.
  6. Mariotti, Marco, 1999. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 733-41, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-53. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Chae, Suchan & Moulin, Herve, 2004. "Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint," Working Papers 2004-01, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Barbera, Salvador & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Working Papers 1196, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Motty Perry & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Open- versus Closed-Door Negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 348-359, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-273, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Kornhauser, Lewis A., 2002. "Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 60, pages 2229-2269 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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