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Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power

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  • Haller, Hans
  • Holden, Steinar

Abstract

When a large group of people is affected by a bargaining outcome, practical reasons often require that the group be represented by an agent in the bargaining. This paper addresses the issue of how the group ensures that the agent reaches an agreement that satisfies the group. The authors show that, by adopting a super-majority ratification rule, the group may improve its bargaining position and obtain a larger share of the bargaining surplus. However, a super-majority ratification rule also involves the risk that a beneficial agreement is rejected by a minority of the group. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 38 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 825-51

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:38:y:1997:i:4:p:825-51

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Cited by:
  1. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Bard Hastad, 2007. "Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1442, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Bester, Helmut & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2001. "Delegated bargaining and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 459-473, August.
  4. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2003. "A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2725-2736, December.
  5. Chae, Suchan & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "A group bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-53, July.
  6. Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 2001. "Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  7. Paola MAnzini & Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Alliances and Negotiations," Game Theory and Information 0004007, EconWPA.
  8. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January.
  9. Holden, Helge & Holden, Lars & Holden, Steinar, 2010. "Contract adjustment under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 657-680, April.
  10. Macartan Humphreys, 2007. "Strategic ratification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 191-208, July.

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