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Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality

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Author Info
Amihai Glazer () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)
Stef Proost () (Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics, Catholic University of Leuven)

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Abstract

Earmarking is a form of bundling in which government adopts a tax policy while specifying the uses of the revenue. This paper explores how bundling can enhance efficiency: it can inform the public of the quality of a program proposed, or of the quality of the agency that will be responsible for designing and implementing the program.We show that policies that appear inefficient in isolation may become justified when bundled.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 060713.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:060713

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Related research
Keywords: Earmarking; Asymmetric information; Bureaucracy; Project evaluation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bos, Dieter, 2000. "Earmarked taxation: welfare versus political support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 439-462, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Darren Filson, . "The Dynamics of Resource Allocation in Research Organizations," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-02, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Brett, Craig & Keen, Michael, 2000. "Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 315-340, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    Other versions:
  6. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Glazer, Amihai & Lohmann, Susanne, 1999. " Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 377-94, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. David M. Newbery & Georgina Santos, 1999. "Road taxes, road user charges and earmarking," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(2), pages 103-132, June. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo, 2001. "Tax earmarking and grass-roots accountability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 99-106, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1988. "Optimal Contests," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 133-43, January.
  13. Anesi, Vincent, 2006. "Earmarked taxation and political competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 679-701, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Meyers, Margaret A, 1994. "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1157-84, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 457. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Richard Bird & Joosung Jun, 2005. "Earmarking in Theory and Korean Practice," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0515, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
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