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Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience

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Author Info
Glazer, Amihai
Lohmann, Susanne

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Abstract

By committing policy, an incumbent in effect disowns an issue; when she maintains policy flexibility, the issue remains electorally salient. Electoral competition shapes political commitment decisions and collapses the multidimensional issue space into a low-dimensional space of electorally salient issues. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 99 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (June)
Pages: 377-94
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:99:y:1999:i:3-4:p:377-94

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Marcus Berliant & Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates," Game Theory and Information 0407003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2007. "Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality," Working Papers 060713, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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