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The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Quaresima

    (Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona)

  • Fabio Fiorillo

    (Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona)

Abstract

This article investigates the patronage phenomenon under a theoret- ical point of view. Legislative dissent could have damaging effects for both party and legislator, i.e., legislators depend on their party for re- election, which in turn partially depends on its reputation of cohesiveness. Nevetheless dissent allows the legislator to build a good reputation with local constituents for re-election sake. Then parties may sometimes bene- fit from tolerating some level of dissent. As a result the party has a double goal. It should require the maximum loyalty from legislators, not ignoring the legislators' reputation with the voters. In this paper we consider pa- tronage as an additional tool for the party to calibrate parlamentarians' loyalty towards the party itself and towards constituencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipu:wpaper:63
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patronage; political selection; exit strategy; bureaucracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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