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A Generalized Model of Rent-Seeking Behavior

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  • Linster, Bruce G

Abstract

In this paper, the author presents a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players' valuations for the prize are represented as vectors. The players in this game are risk neutral and may not be indifferent to who wins the contestable rent if it is someone else. Both G. Tullock's (1967) original rent-seeking model and the public goods rent-seeking model by E. Katz, S. Nitzan, and J. Rosenberg (1990). turn out to be special cases of this more general model. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "A Generalized Model of Rent-Seeking Behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 421-435, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:2:p:421-35
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    Cited by:

    1. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 1-19, May.
    2. Cortes-Corrales, Sebastián & Gorny, Paul M., 2018. "Generalising Conflict Networks," MPRA Paper 90001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
    4. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 40-50.
    5. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2013. "Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 267-277.
    6. Luke A. Boosey & Christopher Brown, 2021. "Contests with Network Externalities: Theory & Evidence," Working Papers wp2021_07_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    7. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "Extremism drives out moderation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 861-887, April.
    8. Bruce Linster & Richard Fullerton & Michael Mckee & Stephen Slate, 2001. "Rent-seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 285-302.
    9. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad, 2021. "Overzealous Rule Makers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 341-365.
    10. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    11. Xiuqin Yang & Feng Liu & Hua Wang, 2023. "Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-18, November.
    12. Aner Sela & Amit Yeshayahu, 2022. "Contests with identity-dependent externalities," Working Papers 2203, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    13. Lotem Ikan & David Lagziel, 2023. "The Indoctrination Game," Papers 2305.02604, arXiv.org.
    14. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2021. "Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 103-116.
    15. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2009. "Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/111, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    16. Michael Brock & Jacqueline Doremus & Liqing Li, 2020. "Birds of a Feather Lockdown Together: Mutual bird-human benefits during a global pandemic," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2019-07, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    17. Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.
    18. Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

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