The Pivotal Mechanism Revisited: Some Evidence on Group Manipulation
AbstractThis paper studies the vulnerability of the pivotal mechanism with respect to manipulation by groups. In a lab experiment, groups decide on the implementation of various alternatives, some of which imply opposite interests for the two subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and explicit collusion by allowing for communication within subgroups in one treatment and prohibiting it in another. Even though all agents' preferences are common knowledge and there exists a simple symmetric collusive strategy for one subgroup, we find little evidence for tacit collusion, not even with increasing experience. Only when explicit communication is allowed, collusion is established, and it becomes even more pronounced over time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2011-15.
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Collective Decision Making; Pivotal Mechanism; Collusion;
Other versions of this item:
- Francesco Feri & Anita Gantner & Wolfgang Höchtl & Rupert Sausgruber, 2013. "The pivotal mechanism revisited: some evidence on group manipulation," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 23-51, March.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-08-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2011-08-29 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-08-29 (Game Theory)
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