The study addresses the issue of sustainability of collusion in one-sided auctions. Earlier experimental studies indicate that, in double oral auctions, collusion is hard to sustain even if conspiracy is allowed and quotation improvement rules are absent. We investigate the role of similar institutional features in one-sided auctions.
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Length: 28 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:610
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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