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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1223.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1223

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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Related research

Keywords: tacit collusion; information; auctions; game theory;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Menezes, Flavio M., 1996. "Multiple-unit English auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 671-684, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2002. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(2), pages 407-36, April.
   Other versions:
   • Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999. "Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Sherstyuk, K., 1998. "Collusion without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 610, The University of Melbourne.
4. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1992. "Coordination in Split Award Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 681-707, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2007. "Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 120-145, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
   • Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Lind, Barry & Plott, Charles R, 1991. "The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 335-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, . "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
9. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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