(When and how) do voters try to manipulate?
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 139 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Strategic voting; Manipulation; Borda rule; Mechanism design; Laboratory experiment; Satisficing; Bounded rationality; D71; C91; D81; D63; D72;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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