Mixed oligopoly, vertical product differentiation and fixed quality-dependent costs
AbstractA private and a public firm face fixed quality-dependent costs of production and compete first in quality and then either in prices or in quantities. In the long run the public firm targets welfare maximization whereas the private firm maximizes profits. In the short run both firms compete in prices or quantities to maximize profits. Mixed competition is always socially desirable compared to a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, mixed competition seems to be a more efficient regulatory instrument than the adoption of a minimum quality standard.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 08-2010.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
vertical product differentiation; mixed oligopoly; quality; price and quantity competition;
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Lutz & Mario Pezzino, 2010. "Mixed oligopoly, vertical product differentiation and fixed qualitydependent costs," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1015, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-06-11 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-06-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2010-06-11 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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