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Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria

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Author Info
Vincent Merlin ()
Jörg Naeve ()

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Abstract

We consider agents who do not have any information about others' preferences. In this situation they attempt to behave such as to maximize their chances to obtain their most preferred alternative. This defines a solution concept for games symmetrical to Barbera and Dutta's protective equilibrium, the demanding equilibrium. Necessary and sufficient conditions for self implementation in demanding equilibria (side) of social choice functions are provided.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany in its series Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim with number 191/2000.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision: 25 Sep 2001
Handle: RePEc:hoh:hohdip:191

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Related research
Keywords: Implementation; Social Choice Function; Demanding Equilibrium; Voting;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001. "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners," Departmental Working Papers 0107, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  2. Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 313-325, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin, 1996. "The Copeland method (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 51-76.
  4. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. E. Maskin, 1983. "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey," Working papers 333, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Borm, Peter & van Megen, Freek, 1998. "Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-175, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eliora Hout & Harrie Swart & Annemarie Veer, 2006. "Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 459-475, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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