Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract
AbstractWe study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by contract as opposed to exclusively rely on state intervention. We characterize which financial contracts are optimal depending on investor protection against fraud, and how efficient is the resulting resolution of financial distress. We find that when investor protection is strong, issuing a convertible debt security to a large, secured creditor who has the exclusive right to reorganize or liquidate the firm yields the first best. Conversion of debt into equity upon default allows contracts to collateralize the whole firm to that creditor, not just certain physical assets, thereby inducing him to internalize the upside from efficient reorganization. Concentration of liquidation rights on such creditor avoids costly inter-creditor conflicts. When instead investor protection is weak, the only feasible debt structure has standard foreclosure rights, even if it induces over-liquidation. The normative implications are that lifting legal restrictions on floating charge financing, convertibles and concentration of liquidation rights, and increasing investor protection against fraud should improve the efficiency of resolutions of financial distress.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series CEI Working Paper Series with number 2008-6.
Length: 50 p.
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Note: This version: October 2007
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More information through EDIRC
Corporate Bankruptcy; Creditor Protection; Financial Contracting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-05-10 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2008-05-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAW-2008-05-10 (Law & Economics)
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