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Optimal "Soft" or "Tough" Bankruptcy Procedures

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Author Info
Povel, Paul

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Abstract

This article describes optimal bankruptcy laws in a framework with asymmetric information. The key idea is that the financial distress of a firm is not observed by its lenders for quite a while. As early rescues are much cheaper than late rescues, it may pay if the creditors are forgiving in bankruptcy, thereby inducing the revelation of difficulties as early as possible. Either "tough" or "soft" bankruptcy laws can be optimal, depending on the parameters. This implies that mandatory one-size-fits-all bankruptcy procedures cannot be optimal. "Hybrid" procedures, which try to combine elements of soft and tough procedures, are found to be redundant, and possibly harmful. Absolute priority rules may be helpful as a part of tough procedures, but their introduction is (partly) inconsistent with the design of soft procedures. The article also reinterprets much of the evidence on the performance of Chapter 11, the "rather soft" U.S. reorganization procedure, questioning many negative conclusions. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 659-84
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:659-84

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  1. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a natural bankruptcy experiment," PSE Working Papers 2006-30, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant," Working Papers w0099, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Inderst, Roman, 2006. "Consumer Lending When Lenders are More Sophisticated Than Households," CEPR Discussion Papers 5410, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN & Erik BERGLÖF & Gérard ROLAND, 2003. "Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  6. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer & Jean-Daniel Guigou, 2007. "Financial versus Social Efficiency of Corporate Bankruptcy Law: the French Dilemma?," Working Papers of CREFI-LSF (Centre of Research in Finance - Luxembourg School of Finance) 07-02, CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg. [Downloadable!]
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  7. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  8. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer, 2008. "Bankruptcy law: a mechanism of governance for financially distressed firms," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 253-267, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Friebel, Guido & Raith, Michael, 2006. "Resource Allocation and Firm Scope," CEPR Discussion Papers 5763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Urs W. Birchler & Dominik Egli, 2003. "Ein neues Bankinsolvenzrecht für die Schweiz," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(II), pages 125-154, June. [Downloadable!]
  12. Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises
    [Strategic default and bankruptcy law]
    ," MPRA Paper 14366, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Alan Schwartz, . "A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1037, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  14. Kenneth Ayotte & David Skeel, . "Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Bankruptcy," Scholarship at Penn Law upenn_wps-1023, University of Pennsylvania Law School. [Downloadable!]
  15. Michelle J. White, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 11536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique
    [Strategic Bankruptcy with accountable and judicial risks]
    ," MPRA Paper 4805, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  17. Kenneth Ayotte & Hayong Yun, . "Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1018, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  18. Acharya, Viral V & John, Kose & Sundaram, Rangarajan K, 2005. "Cross-Country Variations in Capital Structures: The Role of Bankruptcy Codes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4916, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 2001. "Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy," NBER Working Papers 8388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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