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Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks

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Author Info
Manove, Michael
Padilla, A Jorge
Pagano, Marco

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Abstract

Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to facilitate this function, they advocate the strict protection of creditor rights. But banks can serve another important economic function: by screening projects they can reduce the number of project Pilures and thus mitigate their private and social costs. In this article we show that because of market imperfections in the banking industry, strong creditor protection may lead to market equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restrictions on collateral requirements and the protection of debtors in bankruptcy may redress this imbalance and increase credit-market efficiency. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 726-44
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:4:p:726-44

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  1. ONO Arito & SAKAI Koji & UESUGI Iichiro, 2008. "The Effects of Collateral on SME Performance in Japan," Discussion papers 08037, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
  2. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors," Discussion Papers 34, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Koskinen, Yrjo & Rebello, Michael J. & Wang, Jun, 2006. "Market Coditions and Venture Capitalist Experience in Start-Up Financing," SIFR Research Report Series 45, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kenneth Daniels & Gabriel Ramirez, 2008. "Information, Credit Risk, Lender Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP Financing Market," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 35-59, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Catherine Refait, 2005. "Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise? Comprendre la décision de la banque," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Editions Economica, vol. 8(1), pages 131-157, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dorothea Schäfer & Oleksandr Talavera, 2006. "Small-Scale Business Survival and Inheritance: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 636, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2001. "The Political Economy of Finance," CSEF Working Papers 76, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Giorgio Calcagnini & Fabio Farabullini & Germana Giombini, 2009. "Loans, Interest Rates and Guarantees: Is There a Link?," Working Papers 0904, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, revised 2009. [Downloadable!]
  9. Rajkamal Iyer & Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Kelly Shue, 2009. "Screening in New Credit Markets: Can Individual Lenders Infer Borrower Creditworthiness in Peer-to-Peer Lending?," NBER Working Papers 15242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lukas Menkhoff & Doris Neuberger & Chodechai Suwanaporn, 2005. "Collateral-Based Lending in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Thailand," Finance 0501008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Roland Strausz, . "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Papers 022, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Dorothea Schäfer & Dirk Schilder, 2006. "Informed Capital in a Hostile Environment: The Case of Relational Investors in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 549, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  13. Philip Bond & David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, 2008. "Predatory mortgage lending," Working Papers 08-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  14. Hainz, Christa, 2007. "The Effect of Bank Competition on the Bank's Incentive to Collateralize," Discussion Papers in Economics 2007, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Philip Bond & David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, 2006. "Predatory lending in rational world," Working Papers 06-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  16. Matthew M. Sackett & Sherrill Shaffer, 2006. "Substitutes versus complements among credit risk management tools," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(14), pages 1007-1017, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Koskinen, Yrjö & Rebello, Michael & Wang, Jun, 2006. "Venture Capital Financing: The Role of Bargaining Power and the Evolution of Informational Asymmetry," CEPR Discussion Papers 5806, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Dorothea Schäfer & Oleksandr Talavera, 2009. "Small business survival and inheritance: evidence from Germany," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 95-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Hainz , Christa & Weill , Laurent & Godlewski, Christophe, 2008. "Bank competition and collateral: theory and evidence," Research Discussion Papers 27/2008, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Jong, A. de, 2004. "It Takes Two To Tango: an empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks," Research Paper ERS-2004-049-F&A Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  21. Christa Hainz, 2008. "Bank competition - When is it Goog?," Discussion Papers 244, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  22. HOSONO Kaoru & XU Peng, 2009. "Do Banks Have Private Information? Bank screening and ex-post small firm performance," Discussion papers 09016, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
  23. Luigi Guiso & Raoul Minetti, 2007. "The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from US Firms," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/46, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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