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Abstract

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.

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File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/79/34/39/PDF/WP_2012_-_Nr_25.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00793439.

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Date of creation: Oct 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00793439

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00793439
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Related research

Keywords: Network Games; Strategic Complementarities; Supermodular Games; Bonacich Centrality;

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References

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1. Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan, 2008. "Endogenous efforts on communication networks under strategic complementarity," Working Papers halshs-00339159, HAL.
   
   • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroian, 2010. "Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 391-408, July.
2. Yann Bramoullé & Habiba Djebbari & Bernard Fortin, 2007. "Identification of Peer Effects through Social Networks," Cahiers de recherche 0705, CIRPEE.
   
   • Bramoullé, Yann & Djebbari, Habiba & Fortin, Bernard, 2009. "Identification of peer effects through social networks," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 150(1), pages 41-55, May.
   • Bramoullé, Yann & Djebbari, Habiba & Fortin, Bernard, 2007. "Identification of Peer Effects through Social Networks," IZA Discussion Papers 2652, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
3. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, 09.
   
   • Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2005. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Player," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000586, www.najecon.org.
   • Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2004. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Working Papers 178, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
   • Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Who’s Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," CEPR Discussion Papers 5329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
4. Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni, 2010. "Interactions with hidden complementarities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 397-406, November.

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