Network Games under Strategic Complementarities
AbstractWe study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.
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Date of creation: Oct 2012
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Network Games; Strategic Complementarities; Supermodular Games; Bonacich Centrality;
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