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Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity

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  • Mohamed Belhaj

    ()

  • Frédéric Deroian

    ()

Abstract

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination in order to reduce the social dilemma.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-009-0195-0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 391-408

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:391-408

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Related research

Keywords: Communication network; Endogenous efforts; Strategic complements; D85; C72;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Mohamed Belhaj & Yann Bramoullé & Frédéric Deroian, 2012. "Network Games under Strategic Complementarities," AMSE Working Papers 1225, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.

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