Interactions with hidden complementarities
AbstractWe consider a finite population simultaneous move game with heterogeneous interaction modes across different pairs of players. We allow for general interaction patterns, but restrict our analysis to games whose pure strategy Nash equilibrium conditions boil down to a set of piece-wise linear conditions, so that an equilibrium is a solution to a linear complementarity problem. We introduce a new class of games for which a suitable linear transformation of the original interaction matrix induces a game with complementarities. We provide general moderation conditions on the interaction matrix such that a game in this class has a unique Nash equilibrium, that we are able to characterize by means of a closed-form expression involving a generalized version of the Katz network measure of node centrality.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Regional Science and Urban Economics.
Volume (Year): 40 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/regec
Nash equilibrium Uniqueness Complementarity Moderation Interaction matrix Linear complementarity problem;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006.
"Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,"
Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, 09.
- Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2004. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Working Papers 178, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Who’s Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," CEPR Discussion Papers 5329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2005. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Player," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000586, www.najecon.org.
- Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Public goods in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 478-494, July.
- Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2009.
CEPR Discussion Papers
7293, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2009. "Delinquent Networks," IZA Discussion Papers 4122, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2009. "Delinquent Networks," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0912, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
- Borjas, George J., 1998.
"To Ghetto or Not to Ghetto: Ethnicity and Residential Segregation,"
Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 228-253, September.
- George J. Borjas, 1997. "To Ghetto or Not to Ghetto: Ethnicity and Residential Segregation," NBER Working Papers 6176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vives, X., 1988.
"Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Leo Katz, 1953. "A new status index derived from sociometric analysis," Psychometrika, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 39-43, March.
- Bamon, Rodrigo & Fraysse, Jean, 1985. "Existence of Cournot Equilibrium in Large Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 587-97, May.
- Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Joan de Martí, 2007. "Communication Networks: Knowledge and Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 86-91, May.
- Kolstad, Charles D & Mathiesen, Lars, 1987. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 681-90, October.
- Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2012. "Risk taking under heterogenous revenue sharing," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 192-202.
- Mohamed Belhaj & Yann Bramoullé & Frédéric Deroian, 2012.
"Network Games under Strategic Complementarities,"
AMSE Working Papers
1225, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
- Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013. "Network Design under Local Complementarities," AMSE Working Papers 1309, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised 12 Feb 2013.
- Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013. "Network Design under Local Complementarities," Working Papers halshs-00796487, HAL.
- Junjie Zhou & Ying-Ju Chen, 2013. "Targeted information release in social networks," Working Papers 13-04, NET Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.