Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Network Games under Strategic Complementarities

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/files/_dt/2012/wp_2012_-_nr_25.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France in its series AMSE Working Papers with number 1225.

as in new window
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1225

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Network Games; Strategic Complementarities; Supermodular Games; Bonacich Centrality.;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bramoullé, Yann & Djebbari, Habiba & Fortin, Bernard, 2009. "Identification of peer effects through social networks," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 150(1), pages 41-55, May.
  2. Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni, 2010. "Interactions with hidden complementarities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 397-406, November.
  3. Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Who’s Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroian, 2010. "Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 391-408, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bloch, Francis & Quérou, Nicolas, 2013. "Pricing in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 243-261.
  2. Baetz, Oliver, 0. "Social activity and network formation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society.
  3. Yann Bramoull? & Rachel Kranton & Martin D'Amours, 2014. "Strategic Interaction and Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 898-930, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1225. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Yves Doazan).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.