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People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution

Author

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  • Carmen Camacho

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Waleed Hassan

    (UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, KU Leuven VIVES)

Abstract

We study here whether and when a social movement can turn into a successful revolution and modify the production system. To do so, the dynamics of social unrest is de_ned as a function of the number of discriminated workers, and their organizational skills, wage inequalities, and retaliation. Then, taking the evolution of social unrest into account, we obtain the optimal time for a revolution as the moment which maximizes discriminated workers' lifetime welfare. It is proven that if unrest increases with time and if a revolution does improve the discriminated's welfare, then a revolution arises independently of the initial state and the characteristics of the economy. Whenever the gains are high enough, then a revolution arises immediately. Worth noting, we show that even if social movement loses momentum, a revolution arises if the initial mass of discontent is sizeable or the system is so repressive that it becomes necessary to revolt.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmen Camacho & Waleed Hassan, 2023. "People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution," PSE Working Papers halshs-03372991, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-03372991
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03372991v2
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