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Ownership structures and R&D in Europe: the good institutional investors, the bad and ugly impatient shareholders

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  • Olivier Brossard

    ()
    (LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes Sociaux - Université des Sciences Sociales - Toulouse I : EA4212 - École Nationale de Formation Agronomique - ENFA - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Toulouse - Université Toulouse le Mirail - Toulouse II)

  • Stéphanie Lavigne

    ()
    (LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes Sociaux - Université des Sciences Sociales - Toulouse I : EA4212 - École Nationale de Formation Agronomique - ENFA - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Toulouse - Université Toulouse le Mirail - Toulouse II)

  • Mustafa Erdem Sakinc

    (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - CNRS : UMR5113 - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV)

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between ownership structures in large European companies and their innovative activity in terms of R&D spending. The analysis is performed on a sample of 324 large innovative companies over 8 years. Contrary to the view that institutional investors can have a negative influence on R&D spending, we report a positive impact of these investors. Our study also tests the impact of 'impatient' institutional investors and provides evidence of their negative influence on R&D spending.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00843984.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Publication status: Published, Industrial and Corporate Change, 2013, 22, 04, xx-xx
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00843984

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Keywords: ownership structures; institutional ownership; innovation; R&D intensity;

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