IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-02496789.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Saussier

    (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

Abstract

[eng] Transactions costs and contractual choice: an econometric test taking a public-sector enterprise . by Stéphane Saussier . This paper examines the form taken by inter-firm contracts in the light of transactions-costs theory. We maintain that agents' contractual choice is explained by a desire to reduce transactions costs. In order to test the conclusions deduced from the theory, we built up a database of contracts representing the totality of the contractual relationships between Electricité de France and its coal transporters over the period 1977-1997. In a first stage, we explore the factors that may explain the form of contracts in the framework of transactions-cost theory (first part). Refutable propositions are put forward and tested (second part), together with a description of the contractual relations between EDF and its suppliers (third part). The conclusions derived from transactions-cost theory are confirmed by our study. [fre] Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique . par Stéphane Saussier . Ce papier étudie la forme des contrats interfirmes au regard de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Nous soutenons que les choix contractuels des agents s'expliquent par une volonté d'économiser les coûts de transaction. Afin de tester les propositions de la théorie, nous avons construit une base de données de contrats, représentant la totalité des relations contractuelles entre Electricité de France et ses transporteurs de charbon sur la période 1977-1997. Dans un premier temps, nous explorons les facteurs qui peuvent expliquer la forme des contrats dans le cadre de la théorie des coûts de transaction (première partie). Des propositions réfutables sont avancées et testées (deuxième partie) après que les relations contractuelles entre EDF et ses fournisseurs ont été décrites (troisième partie). Les propositions dérivées de la théorie des coûts de transaction sont confirmées par notre étude.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Saussier, 1998. "Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique," Post-Print hal-02496789, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02496789
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    2. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-361, October.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    4. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    5. Claude Ménard (ed.), 2000. "Institutions, Contracts and Organizations," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1921.
    6. Eric Brousseau & M’hand Fares, 2000. "Incomplete contracts and governance structures: are incomplete contract theory and new institutional economics substitutes or complements?," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    8. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
    9. Alan Schwartz, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm73, Yale School of Management.
    10. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    11. Al-Najjar, Nabil I, 1995. "Incomplete Contracts and the Governance of Complex Contractual Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 432-436, May.
    12. Stéphane Saussier, 2000. "When incomplete contract theory meets transaction cost economics: a test," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 25, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1991. "Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 69-99, April.
    14. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    15. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    16. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 561-595.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hakam Kamleh, 2005. "La nouvelle organisation ferroviaire britannique : sur la frontière entre intégration et désintégration," CAE Working Papers 28, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Saussier, Stephane, 2000. "Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Electricite de France," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 189-206, June.
    2. M'Hand Farès & Stéphane Saussier, 2002. "Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 193-230.
    3. Garrouste, Pierre & Saussier, Stephane, 2005. "Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 178-199, October.
    4. Foss, Nicolai J., 2003. "Bounded rationality in the economics of organization: "Much cited and little used"," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 245-264, April.
    5. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Diego Comin, 2005. "Testing Out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer," Departmental Working Papers 200501, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
    7. Nicolai J. Foss, 2010. "Bounded Rationality and Organizational Economics," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    9. López-Bayón, Susana & González-Díaz, Manuel, 2010. "Indefinite contract duration: Evidence from electronics subcontracting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 145-159, June.
    10. Marco Furlotti, 2007. "There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 61-99, March.
    11. Antonio Nicita & Ugo Pagano, 2005. "Incomplete Contracts and Institutions," Chapters, in: Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, Second Edition, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    13. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    14. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
    15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
    16. Wang, Sen & Bogle, Tim & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2012. "Forestry and the New Institutional Economics," Working Papers 130818, University of Victoria, Resource Economics and Policy.
    17. Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Post-Print halshs-03704424, HAL.
    18. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
    19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
    20. Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Market Structure [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02496789. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.