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Incomplete Contracts

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Author Info
Alan Schwartz () (Law School)

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Abstract

Parties to lending agreements can create priority rankings in two ways: by securing a lender or by protecting the lender's debt with financial covenants. Protected debt turns into high priority debt because the early lender will permit covenant violations only if a later lender agrees to subordinate its claim. The Bankruptcy Code sustains both forms of priority by according secured debt senior status and by enforcing subordination agreements among creditors. The latter priority is not controversial but several recent reform proposals would reduce the secured lender's priority. This article argues that creditors who lend early in a firm's life are concerned about debt dilution, which can occur even when all of the borrower's later projects have positive values. It then shows that the equilibrium financial contract for private debt has strong borrowers protecting the early debt with financial covenants, and it suggests that weak borrowers protect the early debt with security. Thus security and financial covenants may be substitutes. "Covenant equilibria" are argued to be efficient. That these equilibria closely resemble "security equilibria," and that arguments for the inefficiency of the secured lender's priority are weak, both argue that the Bankruptcy Code's current respect for both forms of priority should continue. The article also argues that financial covenants should be made binding on later lenders whose advances would cause covenant violations.

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Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm73.

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Date of creation: 21 Jul 1997
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm73

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K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

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  1. Maze, Armelle, 2006. "Multilateral reputation mechanisms and contract law in agriculture : complement or substitutes," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21285, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Michel Renault & Yvan Renou, 2007. "Processus d'individuation, éthique et pragmatisme. A la recherche de fondements théoriques pour appréhender la firme partenariale," Post-Print halshs-00202148_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Axel GAUTIER & Dimitri PAOLINI, 2001. "Delegation and Organizational Design," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001026, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  4. Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, 2004. "Judges' Cognition and Market Order," Economics Working Papers 768, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Josef Windsperger, 2002. "The Structure of Ownership Rights in Franchising: An Incomplete Contracting View," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 129-142, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nicolai J. Foss, . "The Rhetorical Dimensions of Bounded Rationality: Herbert A. Simon and Organizational Economics," IVS/CBS Working Papers 2002-07, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School. [Downloadable!]
  8. SALMON, Pierre & BRETON, Albert, 2005. "Bijural services as factors of production," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2005-01, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
  9. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2003. "The Economic Value of Flexibility when there is Disagreement," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-002/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Armelle Mazé, 2005. "Contract Law and the self-enforcing range of contracts in agriculture," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00354960_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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