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Processus d'individuation, éthique et pragmatisme. A la recherche de fondements théoriques pour appréhender la firme partenariale

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  • Michel Renault

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Yvan Renou

    (LEPII - Laboratoire d'Economie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article aims at providing a new stakeholder theory of the firm which overcomes the limits of the main approach that is generally mobilised to understand the modern corporation : the property rights approach. It is argued that the theoretical foundations provided by the pragmatism appear to be very useful to understand the ethical behaviour of social actors when the decision process is distributed : by insisting on the process of individuation that arises when the situation becomes "problematic", this approach succeeds in taking into account the building of principles of justice between actors of a same corporation.

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  • Michel Renault & Yvan Renou, 2007. "Processus d'individuation, éthique et pragmatisme. A la recherche de fondements théoriques pour appréhender la firme partenariale," Post-Print halshs-00202148, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00202148
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00202148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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