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The Evolution of "Kantian Trait": Inferring from the Dictator Game

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  • Lorenzo Cerda Planas

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold. Starting from the population dynamics literature, which usually finds the resulting distribution of a trait in a population, according to some parents' preferences, I answer the inverted question: Which preference function would yield into a given trait distribution? I solve this using a continuous trait, instead of finite types of agents. Using this result, I connect this transmission theory of social traits with the well-known results of Dictator Game (DG) experiments. I use a specific definition of a Kantian trait applied to DG results, and determine the distribution of this trait that is commonly found in these experiments. With these two ingredients, I show that homo-œconomicus parents have a greater' dislike' or disutility of having offspring with different traits from them compared to their Kantian counterparts. This could be a result of myopic empathy being stronger in homo-œconomicus parents, driving this dislike of difference.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2015. "The Evolution of "Kantian Trait": Inferring from the Dictator Game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01163937, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01163937
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01163937
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Julie Novakova & Jaroslav Flegr, 2013. "How Much Is Our Fairness Worth? The Effect of Raising Stakes on Offers by Proposers and Minimum Acceptable Offers in Dictator and Ultimatum Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(4), pages 1-9, April.
    2. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
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    5. Christoph Engel, 2011. "Dictator games: a meta study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(4), pages 583-610, November.
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    7. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2001. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 298-319, April.
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    Keywords

    population dynamics; Kantian morale; evolutionary equilibrium;
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