Consensus, communication and knowledge : an extension with bayesian agents
AbstractParikh and Krasucki  showed that pairwise communication of the value of a function f leads to a consensus about the communicated value if the function f is convex. They showed that union consistency of f may not be sufficient to guarantee consensus in any communication protocol. Krasucki  proved that consensus occurs for any union consistent function if the protocol contains no cycle. We show that if agents communicate their optimal action, namely the action that maximizes their expected utility, then consensus obtains in any fair protocol for any action space.
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Date of creation: Feb 2005
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Consensus; common knowledge; pairwise communication.;
Other versions of this item:
- Menager, Lucie, 2006. "Consensus, communication and knowledge: An extension with Bayesian agents," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 274-279, May.
- Lucie Ménager, 2005. "Consensus, Communication and Knowledge : an Extension with Bayesian Agents," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05031, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2006.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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- Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul, 1990. "Communication, consensus, and knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 178-189, October.
- John Geanakoplos & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1982. "We Can't Disagree Forever," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 639, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
- Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
- Krasucki, Paul, 1996. "Protocols Forcing Consensus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 266-272, July.
- Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
- Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
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